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Charles Bean, Chief  Economist  and member  of Monetary  Policy Committee, 
Bank  of England 
Is more  central  bank  transparency  a good thing?  In  the  bad old days, cen- 
tral  bankers  saw themselves  as guardians  of the inner  sanctum;  mystique 
was everything.  Today,  transparency  seems to be the norm. But exactly 
how far should that  transparency  go? Standard  macroeconomic  models 
appear to imply that central  banks should reveal everything that they 
think they know in order  to anchor  private  expectations.  But following 
the work of Stephen  Morris  and Hyun Shin (2005),  a little literature  has 
developed that questions whether full transparency  is indeed optimal. 
Morris  and Shin showed that in a world where agents need to form a 
view about the price  expectations  of other  agents,  undue weight will be 
placed on any central  bank (CB)  signal of the overall  price  level, because 
it acts  as a focal  point around  which these expectations  can coalesce.  The 
CB  will be better  off not revealing  its signal  if the precision  of the CB's  in- 
formation  is low and the common  knowledge distortion  is large. 
The present clever, though rather  complex, chapter  by Pierre  Gos- 
selin, Aileen Lotz, and Charles  Wyplosz (GLW)  represents  a useful ex- 
tension of that literature.  While at one time the Federal  Open Market 
Committee  (FOMC)  did not reveal its target  for the Federal  Funds rate, 
most CBs usually reveal their policy rate and therefore  necessarily  re- 
veal something about their perceptions  of the economy in the process. 
The  question  is how much further  the CB  should go. Gosselin,  Lotz,  and 
Wyplosz allow for this and more, by generalizing the Morris-Shin 
framework  for  both the number  of underlying  fundamentals  and the na- 
ture of the uncertainties  that are present. 
In the basic model, partial transparency  -  in the shape of revealing 
the interest  rate  -  dominates  both opacity  and full transparency.  Why is 
that? Revealing something increases the information  available to the 
private sector but simultaneously generates  a common knowledge ef- 
fect.  But  the interest  rate  -  the route  whereby  CB  information  is revealed 
in the partial  transparency  regime  -  is a manipulable  signal. So the CB Comment  53 
can always choose a reaction function that reveals enough informa- 
tion to dominate  opacity,  but not so much that the common knowledge 
effect becomes dominant (i.e., it can lean against the common knowl- 
edge effect). 
In the basic model, the signals of the fundamentals  are privately ob- 
served but the precision  of those signals is common knowledge. In the 
second half of their  chapter,  GLW  drop that assumption  and instead as- 
sume unknown precisions,  which they describe  as generating  a fog ef- 
fect  in which the quality  of the information  transmitted  is lowered.  Now 
full transparency  on the part  of the CB  may be optimal  if the fog is thick 
enough, essentially  because the ability of the CB to manipulate  private 
sector  beliefs through  its use of the interest  rate  signal is impaired. 
What  should we make  of these results?  First,  I should say that  I find it 
very difficult  to map the analysis of the chapter  across to what CBs ac- 
tually do. A key assumption  is that the interest  rate  only functions  as a 
signal in the model and plays no role whatsoever  in affecting  aggregate 
demand or supply.  Even though the policy rate  may be of negligible di- 
rect  importance  to private  agents,  it is the fulcrum  around  which all the 
other  interest  rates  and asset prices  in the economy revolve.  So any aim- 
ing off on the part  of the CB  in order  to manipulate  its signal and offset 
a beauty contest effect carries  a potentially significant  macroeconomic 
cost. I am therefore  somewhat doubtful that policymakers  would ever 
actually  want to choose a reaction  function  in which such considerations 
loomed large. That is especially the case when one views this as a re- 
peated game in which a sequence of interest rate decisions help the 
private  sector  to learn  about the CBs  reaction  function  and thus help to 
condition  future  expectations. 
A second observation  is that this chapter,  like its predecessors  in this 
literature,  assumes that agents observe private and noisy indicators  of 
the true state of the economy and that the structure  of the economy is 
well known. But CBs' information  sets are very largely comprised of 
macroeconomic  indicators that are certainly noisy, but are also pub- 
lished and therefore  common knowledge. If there  is an information  dif- 
ference,  then it largely  resides in differences  in view about the structure 
of the economy.  Gosselin,  Lotz,  and Wyplosz  suggest that  one could just 
flip the interpretation  of A and 6, so as to make A the state and 6 the 
structure  of the economy,  in which case all the results  go through.  How- 
ever, communicating  beliefs about economic structure is in practice 
rather  harder than measuring and communicating  information  about 
the state. 
Third,  the literature  inspired  by Morris  and Shin  seems to me rather  to 54  Bean 
miss why CBs aspire to greater  transparency  and as a result focuses at- 
tention  on peripheral  rather  than central  issues. Central  Banks  aspire  to 
transparency  for essentially two reasons.  The first is an economic one, 
namely to better  condition  expectations,  something  that  the New Mone- 
tary Economics, exemplified by Mike Woodford's magisterial tome 
(Woodford,  2003),  puts right  at center  stage. In particular,  policymakers 
want the private  sector  to understand  how they are likely to respond  to 
data  news so that  market  interest  rates,  asset prices,  and expectations  re- 
spond appropriately.  That  is, they want private  agents  to understand  the 
policy reaction  function.  As the reaction  function  is a complex beast  - 
no  central  bank  actually  follows a Taylor  Rule  -  this is something  that  is 
very difficult  to do and requires  a lot of explanation.  This  communication 
problem  is absent  in most academic  analyses,  which simply assume  that 
private  agents know, or can easily calculate,  the CB's  reaction  function. 
(In  passing, I might also note that  publishing  a CB's  expected  future  in- 
terest  rate  path, as recommended  in some of the recent  academic  litera- 
ture, falls well short of communicating  a reaction  function,  which is all 
about  what happens  if shocks  push an economy  off  its expected  path.) 
The second reason  that  CBs  pursue transparency  stems from  political 
considerations,  in that the Bank  of England  simply could not have been 
given operational  independence  in 1997  without simultaneously  being 
made accountable  to Parliament;  that  was essential  for  democratic  legit- 
imacy.  Indeed, all CBs,  even the most independent, are accountable  in 
some form  or other  to both the government  and the people. A reasonable 
degree  of transparency  on the part  of the CB  is necessary  if it is to be held 
to account effectively.  The issue is how best to do it. For instance,  the 
Bank of England's  Monetary  Policy Committee is legally required to 
publish minutes, including individual votes, and a quarterly  Inflation 
Report  that  explains our thinking.  These are  not optional  extras! 
I conclude that until the academic literature  engages properly with 
why  CBs  seek transparency,  it is unlikely to be of much help in consider- 
ing the practical  question of what is the optimal nature and degree of 
that  transparency.  But  I greatly  enjoyed  reading  the present  chapter  nev- 
ertheless! 
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